Remarks on al-Fārābī’s missing modal logic and its effect on Ibn Sīnā

Wilfrid Hodges

ABSTRACT: We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī’s treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on De Interpretatione. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī’s other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī’s treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn Sīnā’s modal logic. We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī .

تئوری، شبیه‌سازی، و شباهت عصب‌شناختی؛ تئوریِ ذهن پس از۴۰ سال

علی یوسفی هریس

چکیده: یکی از مسائل محوری در علوم شناختی توضیح توانایی ما در فهم دیگران بر اساس نسبت دادن حالات ذهنی است. ما انسان‌ها یکدیگر را موجوداتی صاحب ذهن می‌دانیم و همین فرض در واقع مبنای ارتباط روزمرۀ ماست: با اِسناد حالات ذهنی رفتار یکدیگر را می‌فهمیم و با در نظر گرفتن حالات ذهنیِ همدیگر قادر به پیش‌بینی رفتارِ هم هستیم. اما چه مکانیزم‌هایی به لحاظ شناختی ما را قادر به انجام این کار می‌سازند؟ بیش از چهار دهه است که این پرسش ذهن فیلسوفان و محققین علوم شناختی را به خود مشغول ساخته است. در این مقاله به بررسی دو پاسخ غالب در این زمینه، یعنی تئوری ــ‌تئوری و تئوریِ شبیه‌سازی، می‌پردازیم. در بخش نخست دو مفهوم مختلف از «تئوری» را از هم متمایز کرده شواهد قابل توجهی را در دفاع از نگرش ویژه ــ‌پردازانه ارائه می‌کنیم. در بخش دوم، پس از معرفی شبیه‌سازی به عنوان بدیلی برای تئوری‌ ــ‌تئوری، سه برداشت ممکن از مفهوم «شباهت» در شبیه‌سازی را از هم متمایز کرده، نشان می‌دهیم که هیچ‌یک از آنها خالی از اشکال نیست.


Adam Morton

ABSTRACT: Humans are at their best when they are making things: families, social systems, music, mathematics, etc. This is human flourishing, to use the word in the somewhat un-idiomatic way that has come to be standard in translating Aristotle and developing views like his. We admire well-made things of all these kinds, and the people who make them well. And although “happiness” is not a good translation of Aristotle’s edudaimonia, it is a plausible conjecture about human psychology that people are happiest — most content, most satisfied with their lives, least troubled — when they are accomplishing, making, things of all these kinds, from families to mathematics. And they are miserable when they cannot. One kind of misery comes when one’s efforts are not successful. Families fail, music is detested, “theorems” have counterexamples. Another kind of misery comes when one is blocked from being able to achieve any of the things that human life is shaped around. The focus of this paper is on ways that people’s actions can make other people incapable of achieving properly human lives. This is what I call damage. I think its importance has only recently come to be appreciated; the delay in acknowledging it as a central moral concept has been particularly long in philosophy. And in human cultures worldwide an appreciation of how vulnerable we are to psychological damage is very recent.   s